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Standardisation and social ordering: A change of perspective 
Pablo Schyfter 
 
Abstract 
 
This article examines standardisation in synthetic biology as a form of social coordination 
and ordering. I discuss standardisation by exploring what makes standards possible, and offer 
an understanding based on infrastructures: technical and social systems that support the 
existence and operation of accepted standards. By exploring the role of social infrastructures, 
I contend that standards depend upon social ordering: ways of arranging people in particular 
positions, relations and hierarchies. I suggest that synthetic biologists ought to develop an 
awareness of these social orders, take responsibility for their creation and accept 
accountability for their consequences, both technical and social.  
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This special issue concerns itself with standardisation in synthetic biology. Like many who 
have written on the topic, I am interested in what constitutes a standard in synthetic biology. 
But rather than define the term ‘standard’ (e.g. Arkin, 2008; Sauro, 2008) or discuss the 
challenges faced by those leading the standardisation charge (e.g. Canton, Labno & Endy, 
2008; Frow, 2013) or compare different approaches (e.g. Anderson et. al., 2010) I ask here: 
what makes standardisation possible? The question matters because knowing what makes 
something possible is often necessary for making it real. The question also offers an 
insightful perspective from which to evaluate otherwise hidden facets of standardisation. 
Thus, the question is useful both practically and critically. 
  
I discuss standards and standardisation using the notion of ‘infrastructures.’ ‘Infrastructures’ 
in the literal sense include technological systems, practices and functions. In a figurative 
sense, ‘infrastructures’ enlightens us to the roles played by things seemingly irrelevant or 
tangential, such as trust and social hierarchies. A figurative understanding also supports a 
different way to view and carry out standardisation. 
  
First, I present and explain my social scientific understanding of ‘infrastructures.’ I point out 
basic characteristics of all infrastructures and describe their relevance and importance. I then 
use ‘infrastructures’ to develop a different understanding of standards and standardisation. To 
do so, I introduce the notion of ‘social infrastructures,’ which reveals standardisation to be a 
particular form of ordering people and arranging their behaviour. I explain how this 
viewpoint enables awareness, responsibility and accountability for choices made in 
establishing standards, and the ramifications of those choices. I finish by considering the 
potential for critical self-reflection made possible by a commitment to awareness, 
responsibility and accountability. 
 
Infrastructures 
 
Infrastructures are enablers: their function is to enable and sustain other functions. For 
example, as I write this the electrical grid that distributes power across Edinburgh enables my 
computer’s operations. Put differently, infrastructures are never ends themselves. Motorways 
and streets exist only to make certain forms of modern transportation possible. Absent what it 
makes possible, infrastructure loses all meaning. 
 
Though simple, this description offers insights. First, one cannot understand infrastructures as 
isolated systems. With no understanding of electrical technologies, one can make no sense of 
electrical power plants or distribution grids. What is infrastructure, and to what end does it 
exist, if it enables nothing?  
Second, infrastructures are situated and characterised by that which they enable. They exist 
where and how they do because of the specific functions they are meant to make possible. A 
region’s demand for electricity will set requirements for its power plants. A small plant 
cannot power a metropolis and a massive plant would be an absurd choice to serve a tiny 
hamlet. Infrastructures exist if there exists a demand for what they enable, and they look as 
they do because of local contingencies. 
Finally, as enablers infrastructures establish new affordances. A system that creates and 
conveys electrical power supplies users with new capacities. Where previously those people 
could not operate electrical devices, the infrastructure provides them with the ability to do so. 
Extending a system of roads enables new opportunities for motorised travel (namely, the 
ability to reach more places). Nonetheless, making possible is not unbridled. Constraints 
accompany affordances. Just as important to understanding infrastructures as enablers is to 
understand them as constrained and constraining enablers. 
  
Infrastructures are ubiquitous. They are ever-present or ever-ready because without being so 
they can’t satisfy their function as reliable enablers. Because of their immediate influence on 
our everyday activities and their ever-present character, infrastructures also shape our 
experience of the world. Moreover, because we rely on them and because they affect so much 
of what we do, infrastructures become fixed and long-lasting. Their ubiquity and longevity 
suggest their importance and worth.  
 
Most obviously, infrastructures are important and valuable because we value what they 
enable. For instance, many people enjoy or depend upon the ability to contact others in far-
away places. Communication infrastructures enable such contact, and so we appreciate them. 
More importantly, we come to depend on them. International research projects rely on e-mail 
exchanges and videoconferencing, both made possible by communication infrastructures. We 
arrange our behaviour in accordance with those capacities and come to depend on their 
uninterrupted availability and functionality. In general, we depend on different forms of 
stability that infrastructures provide. We also depend on the stability of infrastructures’ 
capacities and constraints: certainty over what we can and cannot do. 
 
Infrastructures are heterogeneous assemblies of very different components. For example, 
electrical infrastructures include: objects such as generators, power lines, wiring, sockets and 
metres; places such as plants, distribution centres and end-points; practices such as planning, 
fabrication, installation, repair, use, oversight and regulation; knowledge such as 
electromagnetism laws, engineering skills, mundane user knowledge and regulatory 
expertise; and organisations such as power companies, national regulators and technology 
suppliers. Those parts depend on each other and must work together in order for the 
infrastructure to operate successfully. Infrastructures’ heterogeneity supports a united 
outcome. The many parts of an electrical infrastructure enable one capacity: electrical power. 
If they do so successfully, then the complexity is hidden and I see only what is made 
possible. I see the socket and the reaction of my computer to being plugged in; I don’t see 
what made either possible. 
 
As a result, infrastructures are difficult to see. We engage with the farthest tips of their 
longest extremities, such as the wall socket or the water tap. In fact, we only engage with 
what they enable, such as the devices that run on electrical current. There are many reasons 
for this invisibility. Some (like the electrical power grid) are so expansive that one can’t view 
them in their entirety. Others are physically isolated, such as water piping, and so are not 
easily accessible. Most importantly, there is no need to be aware of infrastructures so long as 
they remain functional. I don’t need to see electrical infrastructure if my access to power goes 
undisturbed. That changes once functionality fails and our regular behaviour runs into 
problems, such as our lights being cut. Infrastructures are also visible when they are still 
being built, such as are synthetic biology standards. During that time, infrastructures are 
accessible and open to change. 
 
Standards and social infrastructures 
 
The concept of an infrastructure is relevant to standards and standardisation in many ways. 
Most obviously, one cannot have a universal, reliable and easily adoptable system of 
standards without those things that make it possible. For example, standardisation requires 
systems that make assembly, storage and distribution of genetic parts possible (e.g. Anderson 
et. al., 2010; Endy & Arkin, 1999). They require tools for compiling, storing and sharing data 
that characterise those parts (e.g. Mutalik et. al., 2013). At the same time, infrastructures rely 
on standards. Shared parameters, units, parts and procedures make it possible to build 
infrastructures and to deliver products that depend on them. What binds the two forms of 
dependence is their shared need for social ordering. 
 
Building infrastructures is a type of grudge work not normally celebrated, but vital if 
standardisation is to succeed. Less obviously, but even more important, is social 
infrastructure: forms of social coordination without which standardisation cannot come to be. 
Simply put, a ‘social infrastructure’ is a particular ordering of people in a community. 
Ordering involves the ways that a given community is divided into sub-groups and the ways 
in which its members are sorted among them. It constitutes how the groups relate to each 
other, how people inside of them are assigned roles, responsibilities, allowances and 
restrictions. Orders also include how people are arranged into hierarchies and how social 
power is distributed in different ways to different persons. 
  
Societies are more than just collections of people; they are collections of people who interact 
with each other in certain ways (Barnes, 2001; Wenger, 1998). Social ordering enables those 
interactions. Like all infrastructures, social orders are neither static nor ends in themselves; 
they are dynamic and support other things. The most important is to enable people to 
participate in shared activities. For example, language (an infrastructure) makes possible 
interpersonal communication (a shared practice). Social orders enable diverse populations to 
produce shared constructs. For example, social ordering enables groups of people to plan, 
build and maintain an operational power grid.  
 
Collectives, orders and standards 
 
Many social orders develop without intention or director. Others are planned and installed 
intentionally. Standards in synthetic biology are not a happenstance development. Instead, 
groups of people have produced them deliberately, or are working intentionally to create new 
ones (Frow, 2013). If standards are successful, colleagues coordinate their behaviour 
accordingly and intentionally. That is, the community plans, establishes and follows a 
specific social order (a particular social infrastructure). 
  
We often perceive standards in terms of such things as specified parameters, guidelines for 
practice, configurations of data, blueprints to follow and diagrams to reference. All of these 
exist and all are relevant to standardisation. However, not one of them accomplishes anything 
by itself. If no people subscribe to parameters and guidelines, they are just lists. If nobody 
makes use of blueprints and diagrams, they are just images. Data not put to work are 
meaningless information. Only when people enrol these many things into some kind of 
practice do they accomplish something (Schaffer, 1999). Nonetheless, only some kinds of 
practice will do. 
 
Standards become possible, gain meaning and operate successfully only when practice is 
collective. It makes no sense to talk about standards that only one person follows, since 
standards are supposed to be used uniformly by all (or at least, most) members of a 
community. If by ‘standard,’ we mean ‘same,’ ‘shared,’ or ‘synchronised,’ then multiple 
coordinated people are necessary. While standards are built by people, only when the group 
coordinates its actions appropriately (adopts the right social order) do those standards exist 
and operate only once a specific social order exists and operates (Barnes, 2001; Schyfter, 
2015). Working standards depend on working social infrastructures.  
 
This realisation provides a different understanding of standards. Standardisation involves 
making choices about how to sort people out. That is, it consists of arranging people into 
particular configurations and then enrolling them in specific types of practices. Most simply, 
one must create a group of people that are jointly committed to the standards, and that 
together design, install, use and maintain those standards. Arranging people into particular 
orders also involves distributing responsibilities for different tasks, setting people’s privileges 
and constraints, defining criteria to evaluate people’s behaviours and creating ways to make 
sure that people stay ‘in line’ with the standards (Barnes, 2001; Wenger, 1998).  
 
As a result, we are posed with an important question: as a group develops and establishes 
standards, what form of social orders do they create? As I noted above, infrastructures are 
visible when being put together. The same is true of social infrastructures like social orders. 
Once established, social orders are difficult to see; while still in the making, they are less 
opaque. Synthetic biologists are still putting their standards together, which means that they 
are still constructing the relevant social orders. 
  
Awareness, responsibility and accountability 
 
As they make technical choices about things like design, functionality, assembly, use, 
storage, metrology and terminology, synthetic biologists are making choices about how to 
sort out their people. 
 
Those making the social orders cannot circumvent those choices. Instead, the decision is 
between making the choices actively, or accepting whatever results come to pass. Synthetic 
biologists should ask themselves if surrendering control to chance is the best way to arrange 
their community. I believe that synthetic biologists ought to establish their social 
infrastructure actively. I also believe that three principles can guide their efforts: awareness, 
responsibility and accountability. 
 
Awareness consists of replacing assumptions and commonplace beliefs with more accurate 
understanding. In this case, awareness involves questioning what a standard is, what it 
requires, how it exists and what it causes. Put differently, replacing a view of standards as 
static guidelines or rules with an understanding of standards as active social coordination. 
Awareness consists of realising that making sense of what standards are requires thinking 
about how people in a collective are arranged and how they behave. Finally, awareness 
requires being cognizant of what occurs during the process of developing and establishing 
standards, even if it is not something strictly technical.  
 
Awareness is supplemented with responsibility. People must acknowledge that not just their 
standards, but also that which they establish to make those standards possible, belongs to 
them. Scientists and technologists routinely take ownership of their accomplishments. The 
community also expects people to accept responsibility when practices have negative 
consequences. Responsibility acknowledges persons’ intentional involvement in the making 
of things, such as standards. It also transforms awareness into something with material 
consequences. That is, responsibility brings awareness out of abstraction and into the 
grounded world of synthetic biology practice.  
 
Finally, responsibility demands accountability. Once persons accept that certain 
accomplishments belong to them, they must also be answerable for their consequences. 
Otherwise, responsibility is empty. Those responsible for making standards and for 
supporting standardisation are accountable for the effects of what they produce or endorse. 
They are also accountable for addressing faults, problems and harm done. Just as 
responsibility transforms awareness into something grounded, accountability transforms 
responsibility into something with ramifications. It also sets down ethical expectations, 
commitments and duties.  
 
Shifting perspectives, enabling reflections 
 
The social sciences offer different ways to think about standardisation. Understanding 
standardisation as a form of social ordering makes visible aspects of standards that are 
otherwise obscure. It allows us to move past the immediately accessible at the bench, on the 
screen and in text and talk. Each of these offers a restricted perspective on what constitutes 
standardisation. Moreover, because so many of these things have become rigidly established, 
they offer little in terms of critical thought. A perspective that supports awareness, 
responsibility and accountability makes possible critical self-reflection.  
 
Technologists are no strangers to certain forms of reflection. Even if only implicitly, 
technologists reflect on and evaluate their technical choices in order to ensure technological 
success. Following major malfunctions, such as the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster and 
recent accidents involving Boeing 737 MAX aircraft, procedure calls for evaluation of 
technological choices made (Vaughan, 1996). 
 
Self-reflection based on a social scientific perspective expands technical reflection in order to 
incorporate thinking about what technical choices impose on those carrying out the work. For 
example, it requires people to consider how technical choices establish particular social 
orders, and how those orders shape experiences. Because technical choices cannot be rid of 
their social ramifications, this type of reflection fits effectively into technological 
development efforts. More importantly, this type of reflection enables active, aware decision-
making. It makes explicit developments that would otherwise ‘just happen.’ 
 
Crucially, such self-reflection becomes handicapped, if not prevented, by the 
institutionalisation of standards. Once standards become established and operational, they 
hide their heritage and their inner workings. Successful standardised parts work as reliable 
black-boxes. Users need not know from where they come nor how they work to employ 
standard parts well. Once operational, standards become distant; the same is true of social 
orders. The most effective time to reflect on these issues is before standardisation has become 
shared practice, before new standards have been fixed in place and before the community has 
ordered itself accordingly. The most effective time is when awareness, responsibility and 
accountability remain viable. 
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